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In the management control literature there is growing interest in the role of management control systems (MCS) in
planned organizational change. The existing literature is concerned with either rational, technical change principles or
more social and political interpretations of MCS facilitated change. This paper aims to extend this literature by com-
bining technical approaches to MCS facilitated change with a behavioral approach in the study of two similar orga-
nizations. Moreover, the paper employs a holistic approach to change to develop a comprehensive understanding of
the role of MCS in planned organizational change. A framework by Huy [Huy, Q. N. (2001). Time, temporal capac-
ity, and planned change. Academy of Management Review 26(4), 601–623] is used to provide an integrative approach
that focuses on both rational, systematic practices and the behavioral processes involved in their implementation.
This is achieved by identifying four idealized intervention types: commanding, engineering, teaching and socializing.
Understanding the application of these four intervention types requires analysis of the way they interact through
time.
 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Introduction
The role of management control systems (MCS)




(R.H. Chenhall).important concern for practitioners and research-
ers in management accounting (Burns & Vaivio,
2001). This paper describes the changes involved
in implementing an Activity Based Cost Manage-
ment (ABCM) program and associated change
initiatives in an Australian and a US military
organization over comparable time periods
from the initial design in 1993 for the Australianed.
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tion until 2004 for both organizations.1 Until the
early 1990s, both organizations followed tradi-
tional, operationally focused management with
few formal management controls to integrate pro-
cesses; accounting was used primarily for budget-
ing, on a cash basis. Planning and control by
operational units was guided by military doctrine
and evaluated on the effectiveness in achieving mil-
itary targets. Efficiency, although not totally disre-
garded, was not a major focus. Decisions on
resources were taken at senior levels with resource
allocation determined by government; operational
management focused on execution.
The opportunity to have access to two organi-
zations similar in mission, size, and management
focus that were attempting to implement the same
change to their MCS was, in our view, a relatively
unique opportunity. The similarities of the organi-
zations created a research environment in which
there was a possibility to begin to understand the
impact of alternative implementation decisions
made during the change process. Comparative
case study data could provide the opportunity to
compare and contrast experiences, to identify the
impact of potential differences in reactions based
on differences in internal structures, individual dis-
positions and processes. Comparative case study
data supports a relatively rich analysis of the
empirical phenomena (Yin, 1989). Comparing
and contrasting experiences would provide a
means to evaluate our expectation, drawn from
the extant literature, that there is likely to be no
one best way to use MCS to facilitate change.1 In this paper we use the term ABCM to refer to the specific
practice of ABCM which focuses on identifying cost and value
drivers within work processes. These practices are embedded
within broader MCS that incorporate formal and informal
controls. We define MCS broadly to incorporate both financial
and non-financial controls, formal and informal controls
including subjective data, personal and clan type controls
(Chenhall, 2003). While the organizations studied initially
identified their change initiatives with ABCM, the scope and
implications of the initiatives broadened to incorporate other
controls, such as risk management, performance measurement
and more informal personal controls. Following the language
used in the organizations, in the main, we refer to the change
initiative as involving ABCM.Moreover, the data from the two organizations
provided the opportunity to address the extent to
which change management problems which appear
to be similar when described in terms of the lan-
guage and processes of an accounting practice,
may in fact be different when consideration is
given to the different roots, causes and conse-
quence of the change situation. The potential to
gain insights from comparing and contrasting the
experiences of two similar organizations address-
ing similar issues concerning MCS facilitated
change is illustrated in the studies by Ezzamel, Lil-
ley, and Willmott (2004) and Ezzamel, Willmott,
and Worthington (2004). In the former study,
MCS were seen as helpful in developing an
empowered workforce and relatively harmonious
industrial relations, while in contrast, the second
study shows how MCS lead to employee hostility
and the eventual failure of the MCS.
The direct access to decision makers at multiple
levels in the organizations while the changes were
being implemented also helped to strengthen the
study. For instance, in some cases we were able
to observe directly the reactions of managers to
the demands of the change initiative. Being present
during the everyday activities of managers on and
off for a period of about two years helped manag-
ers become more relaxed with our presence. This
assisted in managers providing us with their can-
did feelings and actions towards the change initia-
tives. The direct observation complemented
archival and interview data. Given the opportunity
offered by the two organizations, positioning our
study within the MCS and change theory literature
was a critical issue to enable a meaningful investi-
gation of the relatively unique research setting.
Organizational change theory has long been
central to studying how organizations transform
themselves through time (Colville, Dalton, & Tom-
kins, 1993; Greiner, 1972; Lewin, 1951; Mintzberg
& Westley, 1992). Planned change has been of par-
ticular interest to those who are concerned with
creating and managing change in ways that
enhance organizational performance (Hofer &
Schendel, 1978; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Porras &
Robertson, 1992). Recently there has been consid-
erable interest in the relationship between the use
of MCS and planned organizational change (see
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ing role of MCS including its potential to drive
organizational transformations). Burns and Vaivio
(2001, pp. 395–396) note that if MCS are seen to
take an active part in the processes that fundamen-
tally transform an organization, how can it be
focused to expose inertia and outdated practices
that should be uprooted? How is MCS argumenta-
tion driving the justification of organizational
transformation? This paper aims to contribute to
an elaboration of these relationships.2 In these approaches change outcomes include the possibility
that organizations may drift in indeterminate ways, rather than
follow a rational planned sequence of change or the rules,
norms or routines related to rational prescriptions, or some
institutional conception of organizational reality (Quattrone &
Hopper, 2001).
3 The studies could be grouped in other ways. We fully expect
other researchers to envision other ways to categorize the
research. This grouping is useful from our perspective in that it
highlights internal and external roles for MCS in the change
process, a theme that is implicit in the analysis of our cases.Previous research into MCS facilitated
organizational change
A variety of perspectives have been used to help
inform the role of MCS in planned change ranging
from the functional logic of MCS driven change to
more political and social concerns that help or hin-
der the way MCS facilitate change.
Prescriptive approaches
The prescriptive literature abounds with the
logic of technical innovation in MCS such as activ-
ity-cost-management (Shank & Govindarajan,
1993), target costing (Ansari & Bell, 1997), life
cycle costing (Shields & Young, 1991), quality
costing (Clark, 1985), and performance manage-
ment innovation such as EVA (McLaren, 1999),
non-financial measures (Ittner & Larcker, 1998)
and balanced scorecards (Kaplan & Norton,
1996). They provide a platform to develop and
implement new strategies and advanced technolo-
gies and new human resource management initia-
tives. There is an extensive body of literature
that has examined how changes in MCS, notably
ABCM, should be implemented to achieve desired
outcomes which typically involve changes in cost
management practices with change outputs related
to reengineering to gain cost efficiency, product
selection and financial success (Anderson, 1995;
Anderson, Hesford, & Young, 2002; Anderson &
Young, 1999; Argyris & Kaplan, 1994; Chenhall,
2004; Foster & Swenson, 1997; Kennedy &
Affleck-Graves, 2001; Krumwiede, 1998; McGo-
wan & Klammer, 1997; Shields, 1995).Context and social issues
Empirical evidence examining the effectiveness
of MCS practices in assisting in organizational
change is equivocal (Burns & Vaivio, 2001). This
has prompted researchers to examine how social
and political issues affect MCS facilitated
change.2 These approaches indicate that the
effects of the technical aspects of MCS in facili-
tating change cannot be understood without con-
sidering how the systems respond to the social
context within which they operate. An important
thrust of much of this work is to show how MCS
helps integrate the intent of change and the vari-
ous social and political factors that may inhibit
or assist change. For example, in attempting to
change from an engineering to a market based
strategic focus, what are the implications for the
role of MCS of pressure from the organization’s
external environment, or internal factors derived
from the need to adopt advanced manufacturing
practices, and the effect of potential change on
internal politics and power relationships? The fol-
lowing sections provide selective examples of
research that illuminates these themes. We group
these studies into four categories to help identify
emerging themes in the literature.3 First, a variety
of studies examine the external context, often
investigating the historical development of the
organization as it responds to external contingen-
cies and how MCS are affected by them and, in
turn, effect the way organizations change. Second,
a selection of studies focus on internal aspects of
the organization to show how MCS help inte-
grate the different information needs of managers
for change depending on their level in the hierar-
chy of the organization. Third, we identify studies
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MCS in developing and supporting networks
and managing interdependencies to help diffuse
and integrate change across the organization.
Finally, the level of analysis moves to the
employees involved in change and the extent to
which their commitment to change is mobilized
by the MCS. These studies consider the individ-
ual at an aggregate level using an industrial rela-
tions perspective. We review this literature in the
following sections.
History and external context
First we examine research that addresses issues
related to the role of MCS, over long periods of
time, in integrating an organization’s reconstituted
values and beliefs with particular rationalities, the
external environmental, and social and political
forces that affect organizational action. Bhimani
(1993) showed how MCS may evolve from ‘distant
antecedents’ derived from unanticipated and
unplanned, socio-historic incidents, and then
develop to integrate the organization’s activities
with these forces and ultimately have a role in
‘affecting and altering organizational possibilities’
(p. 37). A case study of Renault showed how
MCS evolved as a response to the information
needs derived from diverse external forces operat-
ing over the long term, involving the implementa-
tion of scientific management and statistical
thinking and not as a clear, overt response to an
immediate organizational need. The study is infor-
mative as it indicates the need to understand the
broad antecedents to MCS and the way they are
implicated in the change of the organization over
the long term.
Some studies have shown how MCS assist in
changing the strategic orientation of organizations
from traditional values embedded in their histories
to more economically focused approaches based
on commercial principals involving efficiency,
quality and a customer focus. The possibility of
employing MCS to effect a change in culture has
been supported, at least in part, by several studies.
Dent (1991) showed how MCS were used in a rail-
way organization to assist in moving from a cul-
ture dependent on government management to a
business culture focused on new enterprise modesof organizing, patterns of influence and authority,
criteria for action and a move to shorter planning
time horizons. Kurunma¨ki (1999) examined the
transition from a planning allocation system to a
competitive based resource allocation system in
Finnish health care. The introduction of market
forces and accompanying financially oriented
MCS were introduced to encourage increased cost
consciousness and accountability. The MCS
assisted in shifting power from health care provid-
ers to health care financiers and a general move to
economic reasoning. Llewellyn and Northcott
(2005) showed how hospitals in the UK have used
cost data to provide comparisons of efficiency.
However, an outcome of this process has been a
tendency to create ‘averageness’ in practices as
the MCS encourages behaviors and practices to
be molded into standardized categories, using
average costed clinical classifications (HRGs) as
benchmarks.
Ezzamel and Bourn (1990) examined a UK uni-
versity experiencing a financial crisis and showed
how a MCS, initially based on financial controls
and then later developed to include new formal
and informal controls, was used in different ways
at different stages of the changes involved in recov-
ery. In the early stages of the crisis the MCS high-
lighted the political dimensions, assisted in
managing uncertainty and conflict and facilitated
compromise and helped generate new ideas. In
later stages when novel ideas were critical to man-
aging the change the MCS was not helpful as it
had no surveillance capabilities and lacked flexibil-
ity to respond to uncertainties by means of exam-
ining strategic possibilities. Soin, Seal, and Cullen
(2002) examined how the introduction of ABC in a
UK bank was partially effective in encouraging
organizational change to a more entrepreneurial
orientation. ABC was successfully institutional-
ized and demonstrated links between costs and
products but did not transform strategic thinking.
The later was due to conservatism, and a desire to
maintain existing managerial discretion and a lack
of technical understanding of the potential of
ABC to help change strategy. Using survey-based
methods Henri (2006) showed that performance
measures can focus organizational attention,
support strategic decision making and legitimize
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by a dominance of flexibility values over control
values. Performance measures were seen to stimu-
late and guide innovation, creativity, learning and
change.
Integrating change between central and operational
sub-units
A second line of research has considered the
role of MCS to provide for integration between
the needs of corporate managers to monitor the
financial consequences of decentralized activities
with controls to enable both senior and opera-
tional managers to keep in touch with the emerg-
ing longer term strategic issues that are related to
managing successful change. Roberts (1990)
describes a situation characterized by change
based on an acquisition and the use of profit cen-
tered structures and a financially based MCS. To
overcome a consequence of a preoccupation with
immediate financial results of production activity
and a distancing from issues concerning long term
innovative strategies, management used confer-
ences as an alterative form of accountability. This
helped resolve the tension between myopic finan-
cial concerns with strategy issues. Also, confer-
ences helped engage employees in difficult
decisions of cuts in production volume and the
workforce, and helped develop a sense of interde-
pendence between units and functions within the
organization. The author stressed the important
role for MCS in change situations to integrate
individual action and mutual dependence. Seal
(2001) examined a firm changing from diversified
products to a more limited set of industries and a
move to a more innovative culture. A financially
controlled MCS had stultified the old organiza-
tion and the new identity sought more innovative
MCS consistent with innovation and learning.
The MCS evolved to integrate the changes by
combining a shareholder value approach at head
office with more local innovative MCS, although
not in any coherent way. While it was not clear
that the different types of MCS were effective in
implementing the new strategy, the authors con-
clude that for MCS to help effect change they
need to be sensitive to the trade-offs between stra-
tegic, financial and operational matters, and inno-vation and economic viability. Collier (2001)
showed how MCS can integrate traditional finan-
cial control for external constituencies with more
local information needs. This study showed, in a
UK Police Force, how decentralized, local finan-
cial management, based on budgetary systems,
helped encourage changes in financial control
for the needs of external regulators while enabling
local commanders more freedom of choice over
resources to commit to technical policing work.
Ideas of loose coupling provided the basis to
explain the integration between external and
internal users’ needs.
Diffusing and integrating change across the
organization
A third stream of research has focused on the
role of MCS in providing for integration of
change participants across the organization. Bri-
ers and Chua (2001) showed how an Australian
mining company used ABC to gain improvements
in the quality of its cost information with a view
to ensuring that existing products maintained
their market share and new profitable products
were constantly developed. Change was sustained
by the involvement of networks of parties inter-
ested in ABC who reinforced the implementation
by using ‘boundary objects’ such as common data
bases for different parties to draw upon, and
visionary beliefs as to the usefulness of MCS that
all parties could believe in. Dechow and Mourit-
sen (2005) stress the importance of boundary
objects, arguing that ERP systems act by
enabling individuals to take into account issues
across the organization and demand information,
both from ERP and elsewhere, concerning inte-
gration of effort across the organization. Quatt-
rone and Hopper (2005) also studied ERP
showing how it can provide for different modes
of control between corporate and divisional units.
It may reproduce conventional accounting con-
trols and be consistent with maintaining the sta-
tus quo and an incremental process of change.
On the other hand it may provide real time infor-
mation in matrix form, breaking down conven-
tional financial accounting, therefore providing
a sense of minimalist control, a system more con-
sistent with more dramatic change. Vaivio (1999)
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sures were used in an attempt to integrate cus-
tomers with the innermost activities of the
organization. The author showed how this
approach lead to a restructuring of an organiza-
tion, altered patterns of dependency and power
and made visible new dimensions of performance
which generated negative encounters between
management accountants and other managers.
Resistance to the new MCS from local opera-
tional managers resulted in a struggle with ‘the
quantified customer’ approach. More qualitative
approaches based on local knowledge were
adopted to account for complexities of the inter-
dependencies between customers and the rest of
the organization not captured in performance
measurement systems. Nørreklit (2003) argued
that balanced scorecards have a role in providing
‘‘rhetoric’’ that is a key management tool that
can integrate all interested parties within the net-
work of the organization, keeping them informed
and in check (see also, Ezzamel & Bourn, 1990).
Euske and Riccaboni (1999) studied the role of
MCS in an Italian bank over the long-term
including its privatization. MCS were seen to be
a flexible tool in managing a series of interdepen-
dencies. These interdependencies involved satisfy-
ing competing interests such as those of returns
to stockholders and regulatory control require-
ments; the requirements for regulatory informa-
tion by the State and information on
adaptability to meet the evolving competitive
environment. The study also showed how a well
developed MCS helped the bank make the transi-
tion to the private sector.
In a similar vein, several studies have shown
how MCS can integrate the need for financial or
social legitimacy with local operational needs.
Llewellyn (1998) used ideas of organizational
boundaries to help explain how welfare profes-
sionals could use costing information to make
value for money assessments while maintaining
boundaries between their new financial roles and
a caring culture. Likewise, Modell (2001) exam-
ined how MCS can be used in public sector
reforms to provide for social legitimacy as pre-
dicted by new institutional theory, and to achieve
efficiency gains, following traditional functionalistperspectives. A case study of a hospital indicated
the proactive use of MCS, such as DRG based
performance measures, provided legitimacy but
also helped managers strengthen financial control.
Ansari and Euske (1987) showed that while an
improved costing system in a US Defence organi-
zation did not result in efficiency gains, it did pro-
vide for legitimacy, caused managers to develop
concern with providing better accounting systems,
changed the nature of dialogue and lead to con-
ferences where costing was discussed. Abernethy
and Chua (1996) studied the introduction of cost-
ing and budgetary systems in an Australian hospi-
tal that had been through a process of a change
from values based on physicians to ones that
included a stronger emphasis on managerial val-
ues. While the MCS did not generate efficiency
gains they were of symbolic value supporting
strategies of resource management. While this
was important to satisfy the concerns of funding
bodies the MCS was seen to go beyond this and
was important in supporting the new resource
management culture that became the way of man-
aging the hospital.
Gaining employee commitment to change
The fourth set of studies recognizes that change
facilitated by MCS will involve an integration
between technical concerns with MCS practices
and the extent to which employees embrace the
MCS and the change initiatives. In the main these
approaches have considered employees at an
aggregate level, taking an industrial relations per-
spective. Bougen (1989) examined how an MCS
was used to create a profit sharing scheme with
employee collaboration that was central to the
industrial relations in a UK engineering company.
This was successful in facilitating improvements in
efficiency and competitive position. However, the
scheme was not as successful in the process of
joint consultations between employees and man-
agement, with employees being critical of the reli-
ability of the accounting data, and more
importantly accounting was seen by employees
as providing management with dominant power
over the interactions focused on the rights and
privileges of different classes of organizational par-
ticipants, with specific consequences that labour
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nomic benefits. The scheme terminated after nine
years with the case organization merging with
another company. Research by Chenhall and
Langfield-Smith (2003), also, investigated the role
of a gainsharing scheme in encouraging change in
an Australian manufacturer. This scheme was suc-
cessful in improving work practices within conven-
tional structures but when the organization
introduced self-managed teams as part of its
human relations initiatives, the gainsharing system
with its individual self-gain focus, was incompati-
ble with the high level of cooperative effort and
trusting behavior necessary to develop mature
teams. Miller and O’Leary (1994) considered the
role of MCS, as an important body of expertise,
in making possible the changes involved in
‘advanced, flexible, customer focused manufactur-
ing’ with its emphasis on a ‘new economic citizen-
ship’ based on process improvements driven by an
empowered work force. Ezzamel et al. (2004) also
report the positive role of performance measures
to regulate and transform organizational prac-
tices. New performance measures (inscriptions)
were used to facilitate change in a manufacturing
firm from a cost-plus defence regime to one
focused on cost, quality and delivery. The impor-
tant role of MCS in effecting change through
team-based structures was emphasized with the
work practices involved in the change being
designed by ‘empowered’ workers. The MCS
helped define the organization’s mission and
moved centers of power away from engineers to
a financially centered complex that promoted cost
awareness and the ‘new commercial agenda’ (see
also, Ezzamel & Bourn, 1990; Abernethy & Chua,
1996). While not entirely embraced by the work
force, the case indicates that the pressures for sur-
vival muted any significant resistance. In a con-
trasting study, Ezzamel et al. (2004) examined
the role of MCS in a UK manufacturer undergo-
ing changes involving new manufacturing over a
20 year period. The case identifies difficulties with
labour relations as central to developing employee
suspicion and resistance towards new ABC type
systems and inhibiting their effective implementa-
tion and potential facilitating role in the change
situation. The case showed that a well entrenchedcooperative culture of ‘unplanned responsible
autonomy’ hindered management’s efforts to
introduce new methods of centralized control
based on ABC.
Summary of previous research
The research summarized above provides
examples which stress that for MCS to help effect
organizational change users need to be sensitive to
the way their organization relates to the changing
environmental context and the implications to
changing the culture of the entity. Additionally,
the research has identified that MCS can assist
users in managing change by providing different
information that is relevant to the needs of man-
agers at various levels in the hierarchy. Also,
MCS can be implicated in the development of user
networks and of boundary objects within the
organization. Finally, effective change involves
employee commitment and the literature has
shown how this may be assisted or hindered by
the role of MCS within the context of industrial
relations. To understand these issues the existing
literature has, in the main, adopted an aggregate
level of analysis drawing on approaches that
incorporate a number of perspectives such as insti-
tutional theory, actor network theory and bound-
ary objects, and theories from multiple disciplines
including economics, operations management and
human relations.
From this review we identify two gaps in the lit-
erature. First, while the studies employ a broad
range of theories they do not explicitly consider
theories of change. Much can be learned about
MCS facilitated change by considering what is
involved in various dimensions of change as orga-
nizations transform themselves through time. Sec-
ond, while individuals are considered in existing
approaches, with many studies noting the impor-
tance of concepts such as employee empowerment,
there is little analysis of how and why individuals
respond differently to the various aspects of orga-
nizational change and how this may evolve
through time. We aim to illuminate the topic of
MCS facilitated change by employing a holistic
model of change, as developed by Huy (2001),
which focuses on both technical and behavioral
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that this approach is important as it provides a
basis to show how seemingly similar ways of think-
ing about MCS facilitated change will have vary-
ing effectiveness depending on how the tangible
attributes of the MCS combine with requisite
behavioral changes. Our study aims to show how
technical and behavioral aspects have to be com-
bined to suit the particular circumstances of the
organization.
In summary, the current study aims to comple-
ment existing research and to extend the scope of
the investigation by integrating the technical
approach to MCS with a behavioral approach that
focuses on how individual users respond to MCS
facilitated change. We sought to study change over
a relatively long period of time as we wished to
understand the more gradual and non-linear
change processes that involve irregular and spo-
radic responses of individuals to change initiatives
and the longer term implications for the organiza-
tion. Moreover, our approach considers a theory
that explicitly examines different modes of organi-
zational change, rather than discussing change
through the lens of more general social theories,
as employed in the above literature. Consequently,
we are able to develop the theme of integrating
various elements of MCS facilitated change but
do so with a specific theoretical focus of integrat-
ing MCS with individual user’s reaction to change,
and do so by considering various modes of change
and the way they interact.
In the next section we present the theoretical
framework used in the paper. We then provide
an overview of the research sites and the organiza-
tional environment. This is followed by a descrip-
tion of our research method. Next we describe the
role of the MCS in the change process in each
organization using a framework developed by
Huy (2001). In the following section, we interpret
the findings from the two organizations involved4 Rational issues involve purposive change in the design of
MCS and other structural and work-related initiatives. Behav-
ioral concerns involve the actions of individuals and include
consideration of the cognitions or the knowledge structures,
core beliefs and schemas that influence the way individuals
respond to change initiatives (Walsh, 1995).in our study in terms of Huy’s theoretical frame-
work to provide a more informed presentation of
the change process. We close with a brief conclud-
ing discussion.Theoretical framework
Responding to a proliferation of change theo-
ries, several commentators have attempted to inte-
grate theoretical perspectives into more
comprehensive frameworks to explain how and
why change unfolds (e.g., Dunphy, 1996; Raja-
gopalan & Spreitzer, 1996; Van de Ven & Poole,
1995; Weick & Quinn, 1999). An important con-
cern in bringing together theories of planned
change is the combination of prescriptions that
stress purposive interventions in technical and
social systems employing highly rational change
management techniques with approaches that are
more concerned with understanding how behav-
ioral interactions between individuals will lead to
changed cognitions and belief structures. More
holistic approaches attempt to understand why
the effects of purposive interventions may be
enhanced, or hindered, by a match, or mismatch,
between assumed and actual cognitions (Raja-
gopalan & Spreitzer, 1996, pp. 64–68). Given
our goal was to find a theory that effectively
addressed both rational and behavioral dimen-
sions of the change process, the holistic theories
are more applicable to this study. However, as
Tolbert and Zucker (1996) noted different theories
can be used to explain the same phenomena in an
organization. So within the set of holistic theories
we sought one that would particularly inform the
discussion of the relationship between MCS
change and the way an organization responds to
both technical and behavioral concerns through
time.
Examination of theories of change indicates
that there are many aspects of change (Greenwood
& Hinings, 1996), but certain aspects may be par-
ticularly significant in examining technical and
behavioral concerns. These are the technical con-
tent of the MCS facilitated change and how well
individual users respond to this content over time.
While content issues are well established in most
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itly in change theories with its implications largely
unexamined (Mosakowski & Earley, 2000; Quatt-
rone & Hopper, 2005). The interrelationship
between content and time provides a powerful
basis to understand technical and behavioral issues
involved in change. Some technical aspects of
planned change can be changed faster than others,
depending on the extent to which individuals
embrace the element of change. Most notably for-
mal structures can be changed more quickly than
changes from traditional, historically grounded
values to new and different beliefs and values (Bar-
tunek, 1984). Two aspects of time become impor-
tant to its explicit treatment in change theories.
These are conceptions of time as quantitative or
qualitative (McGrath & Rotchford, 1983;
Sztompka, 1993). Quantitative time refers to clock
time that is linear and can be precisely measured in
ways that are common to all individuals. This
form of time is typically applied to effecting the
content aspects of change, such as formal planning
and budgeting. Qualitative time is particularly
important to understanding behavioral issues
associated with organizational change. It can flow
in different and indeterminate ways depending on
the interpretations given to events by individuals.
Qualitative time presents challenges to change pro-
cesses as it cannot be measured or managed easily.
Huy (2001) provides a framework that satisfies our
criterion for an approach to change that incorpo-
rates technical content issues of MCS facilitated
change and the extent to which these affect individ-
uals response to change though time.
Huy (2001) argues that there are four ideal
types of planned change: commanding (formal
structures), engineering (work processes), teaching
(beliefs) and socializing (social interrelationships).
Each type is described by identifying specific prac-
tices and the nature of the implementation proce-
dures, including leadership and the pacing of
change. Planned change involves combining these
ideal types, deciding on the sequencing of the types
and the timing of this sequencing. The effectiveness
of change depends on matching these ideal types to
suit the context of the organization and the dispo-
sitions of individuals involved in change. Table 1
presents the assumptions underlying the changeintervention types. We use the framework to
examine the role of ABCM as a platform to induce
a planned change from a military to a more busi-
ness like, managerial orientation. In this section,
we outline the essential practices and procedures
of each ideal type.
The approach developed by Huy has distinct
temporal assumptions associated with each
planned intervention mode. As temporal assump-
tions differ between modes of change, it becomes
important to examine the effective sequencing, tim-
ing and the pace of change when considering how
multiple intervention modes are sequenced or act
in combination. As indicated above, other theoret-
ical perspectives could be used (Van de Ven &
Poole, 1995). However, the explicit consideration
of the different intervention modes and the multi-
ple conceptualizations of time make the Huy
framework particularly attractive for the analysis
of the role of MCS as a basis for change, when
studying change over a relatively long period of
time (McGrath & Rotchford, 1983).
The commanding intervention follows the
approaches taken in formal strategic planning
involving examination of the external and internal
situations, applying analytical frameworks to
make changes in tangible organizational attributes
such as introducing formal structures, acquisition
or divestment of people, assets and systems. Lead-
ership is by a top management team who employs
a power-coercive style and is assisted, typically, by
external consultants. There are clear orders and
sanctions to ensure compliance. Preferred changes
are paced in a rapid way to prevent resistance
developing momentum. The outcomes of change
are near-term and progress towards these is mea-
sured in linear, clock-time, which is the same for
individuals at both higher and lower levels in the
organization. While this intervention aims to
achieve highly visible outcomes in tangible factors,
it is unlikely that a command intervention will fos-
ter long-term changes in basic beliefs and values.
The engineering intervention is concerned with
analyzing, understanding, and redesigning work
processes to improve the quality and speed of
work. Approaches such as TQM, quality circles
and process reengineering typify this type. Change
leadership is managed by skilled work process
Table 1
Assumptions of change intervention ideal types




operators of a tightly
coupled organization
A machine organization
with thinkers and doers
Guided learning culture Organic open system
Conception of time Quantitative Quantitative Qualitative (inner time) Qualitative (social time)
Entrainment factors Outside the organization Inside the organization






Time perspective Near term Medium term Moderately long-term Long term
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top-down driven change





Role of change agents Commander Analyst Teacher Facilitator, role-model
Typical change actions Demand strict compliance Analyze, design work
processes and develop
task-based skills
Probe, reveal, teach Facilitate, empathize,
self-monitor








Outside process consultants Ordinary organizational members























































5 Australian Case, Organization Planning Committee ABCM-
Implementation Strategy, November 1994, p. 2; US Case,
General Accounting Office Study, 1993. Government docu-
ments that are cited are not listed in the references. The
citations are by design not complete to maintain the anonymity
of the organizations.
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cal skills. Time is clock-time but is paced to the
overall logic of the work processes. As processes
and skills take time to understand and develop,
pacing is somewhat slower than in the command-
ing intervention with the type favoring medium-
term pacing. Success is based on employees’ accep-
tance and use of new work practices.
The teaching intervention involves a formal
analytical and guided learning approach in which
individuals collaborate with a change agent to
change their own personal fundamental beliefs.
The approach uses outside intervention agents to
undertake cognitive diagnoses as a prelude to
change in behaviors that will enable individuals
to learn freely and to accept new values and
beliefs. Because individuals will be involved in
comparing the changing situation with their past,
the change initiative recognizes an individual’s
‘inner time’. Inner time is subjective with different
events seeming to be passing more or less rapidly.
Accommodating inner time requires change agents
to be patient and avoid generating too much per-
sonal distress by ‘rushing’ events. This mode
entails a moderately long time period involving a
gradual and voluntary process that can rarely be
imposed by pure power.
The socializing intervention focuses on the
quality of social relationships among organiza-
tional members and involves issues of individual
emotions, power and politics. As such, this ideal
type is more concerned with behavioral factors
associated with the process of change. Changes
in behavioral interactions are seen as a prelude
to changes in beliefs (unlike learning that sees
changes in beliefs leading to changes in behavior).
Leadership is provided by change agents who are
often self-motivated employees. These employees
have accepted and believe in the change. They
attempt to engage in experiential learning with
others. The concept of time is qualitative social
time that is defined by meaningful events involved
in social processes, such as bonding. The pace of
change therefore depends on when meaningful
events occur that enhance social bonds. Change
occurs through the process of personal, open and
imaginative conversations. People respond based
on the nature of the relationship between them-selves and others. Socializers differ from teachers
because the former need to change themselves
while the later are outside or transient to the social
systems. The phasing of this type is gradual and
long term with change in relational behavior pre-
ceding changes in values. Change agents guide
the change process in a cooperative mode with
individuals taking time to decide if the proposed
change improves their welfare and is not just
opportunistic.Overview of the organizational environment
and the research sites
In this section we provide a brief general
description of the organizational environments
and of the two research sites. The following sec-
tions develop a more detailed description of the
environments and research sites.
Organizational environment
In the early 1990s, both organizations studied in
this research faced political pressure to improve
efficiency, to identify the resources associated with
different levels of readiness and to become more
accountable for the use of public resources.5 This
is consistent with a trend in many Western coun-
tries for the entire public sector to be more
accountable for public resources and to move from
a ‘bureaucratic’ mentality to a more ‘business ori-
ented’ approach to management (Wanna, Jensen,
& de Vries, 2003). These pressures extended to
defence with the governments causing the armed
forces to justify costs and, more generally, demon-
strate concern with delivering outcomes in effective
and efficient ways. Innovative MCS, based on
ABCM, were seen as a way to map activities to
different capabilities and to associate costs with
these activities. On the basis of working with this
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mentation and the senior management claimed
that they expected that the organizations’
operational management would move from the
traditional military effectiveness focus to an orien-
tation that focused on efficiency fostering a cost
consciousness. This would enhance understanding
of the costs and benefits of different capabilities
associated with varying degrees of readiness.6 In
particular for the Australian organization, senior
management recognized that they would be in a
position to develop other MCS practices such as
performance measurement systems and use the
information for innovative decision tools such as
risk management and outsourcing decisions. This
would satisfy political pressure for more account-
ability and better equip senior management to
argue for new resources or indicate the resource
and capability implications of budget cut-backs.
More generally, for both organizations, it was
expected that the MCS would provide a basis for
improved understanding of processes with a view
to enhancing effectiveness and efficiency.
At the outset of the project the sponsors of the
Australian ABCM application believed that the
systems would provide near-term improvements
in data for resource management while developing
in parallel an embedded ABCM that would sup-
port a more managerial culture.7 However, they
recognized that this would be unlikely to be
unproblematic. In a 1994 document that formed
the basis for a Roundtable involving senior man-
agement and members of a professional account-
ing group the following areas were seen to
provide ‘organizational constraints’:8 lack of a
clear and concise planning process which exposes
the relationship between resources, activities, out-
puts and outcomes; the structure based on
‘Defence Program Management and Budgeting’6 Australian Case, ABCM Project Deliverables, Attachment
B, Statement of Requirements, p. B1, B4, March, 1995; US
Case, Activity-Based Cost Management at the US Organiza-
tion: A view from the Top, Undated.
7 Australian Case: Strategic Advisory Committee Paper,
1994.
8 Expected Outcomes of ABCM: How do we action it,
develop and sustain this network and gain value, 1994, pp. 3–4.generates artificial boundaries that inhibits draw-
ing links between activities, outputs and outcomes;
the existing accounting culture, supported by
financial systems, do not allow for assigning costs
to levels of preparedness; information systems
involve in excess of 150 applications including 30
logistic systems with their 42 associated interfaces
present challenges to move to a more integrated
data base to serve ABCM; and change initiatives
are considered as threats by some managers. It is
noteworthy that these potential technical and
social problems were identified at the outset. The
implementation strategy was to involve
‘‘. . .addressing the organizational constraints,
adopting a cautious, phased implementation, and
engendering a high level of organization-wide com-
mitment to the success of the undertaking’’.9 Not-
withstanding such expectations the organization
still had great difficulties in overcoming both tech-
nical and social problems during the initial stages
of the change program.
Research sites
Facing the same type of pressure from their
respective governments to become more account-
able in the use of resources and for their efficiency
and effectiveness in delivering outcomes, both
organizations decided to adopt ABCM as a way
of helping to move the administration of the orga-
nizations towards more modern managerial princi-
ples. Both went through periods of embracing
ABCM, a period where the ABCM atrophied
and a renewal phase. The organizations developed
reputations for being innovative in the application
of MCS to drive change. In the Australian case, a
presentation was developed for use by a US
defense organization (not the US organization that
is part of this study) to present how the MCS was
used to refocus on the issue of capability manage-
ment.10 In the US case, the organization was iden-
tified by the General Accounting Office as one of
the leaders in the federal government in the imple-9 Expected Outcomes of ABCM: How do we action it,
develop and sustain this network and gain value’, 1994, p. 4.
10 Presentation developed by the US Government to under-
stand the Australian organization’s use of MCS, 1998.
Table 2
List of individuals interviewed
Headquarters staff Operational staff
Australian organization Chief Financial Officer Command A: Business Manager
Director of Accounting Practices Command B: Business Manager
Acting Director Budgeting and Plans Command B: Systems Trainee
Initial ABCM Project Leader Command C: Business Manager
Second ABCM Project Leader Command C: Director Performance Measurement Systems
ABCM Analyst 1 Command D: Business Manager
ABCM Analyst 2 Command D: IT Systems Officer
ABCM Software Design Team Leader Command D: Systems Trainee
ABCM Software Design Team Member 1
ABCM Software Design Team Member 2
Lead Training Consultant
US organization Deputy Chief of Staff Commanding Officer Command A
Manager of Financial Systems Chief Financial Officer Command A
Director of Risk Management Comptroller Command A
ABCM Project Coordinator Manager Command B
Lead Pilot Project Consultant Manager Command C
Manager Command D
ABCM Implementer Command D
Manager Command E
ABCM Implementer Command E
Comptroller Command F
Comptroller Command G
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accountability and refocus the organization on
performance management.11 Additionally, the
organizations have similarities in recent histories
that involved considerable pressure for change
derived from government pressure to identify
potential areas for resource cut-backs and to assess
the efficiency of the organizations.1213 It was the continuing involvement of the researchers with
the two organizations that made them aware of the use of MCSResearch method
In this section we discuss the sources of our
data, the data collection procedures and the
method of analysis.
Data sources and collection
This study examines MCS change in the two
organizations over the period 1993 until the end11 US Case, General Accounting Office Study, 1996.
12 Australian Case, Wanna and Bartos, 2003; US Case,
General Accounting Office Document, 1990.of 2004. The researchers had contact with the
organizations from the early 1990s primarily by
way of the organizations’ involvement in profes-
sional management accounting groups to which
the researchers belonged.13 Most of the data for
this study were collected over a two-year period
between January 2003 and December 2004. Four
types of data were gathered: interview, archival,
public and official documents and observation of
administrative processes. Because of the militarily
sensitive nature of some of the administrative
procedures, the analysis relies mainly on inter-
views, archival and public records. Thirty-five indi-
viduals were interviewed using a semi-structured
approach. See Table 2 for a listing of the individ-
uals and job titles. On average the interviews lastedin the change process. Once, the researchers realized that this
was a relatively unique opportunity to study the use of the same
type of MCS in implementing planned change in two similar
organizations, they approached senior management in the two
organizations and requested access.
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24 months of the study. Initial interviews took
place with two researchers present. Given the pos-
sibility of militarily sensitive information being
discussed, meetings were not tape recorded. How-
ever, notes were taken and debriefing between the
interviewers was undertaken after all sessions.
Subsequently, detailed notes were written up. Over
the period of the study, we interviewed most of the
key participants who had been involved in the
implementation of the MCS at some time over
the studied period. In some instances, these indi-
viduals were still within the defense forces, others
had moved to other occupations. Interviews
focused on the experiences of the participants with
the development of the MCS and the planned tran-
sition from the military-styled administration to a
more managerial focused approach. Key partici-
pants were re-interviewed, some multiple times,
as the change programs evolved. Follow-up inter-
views were conducted with either one or two
researchers present. There were nine follow-up
interviews in the Australian organization and 11
in the US organization. In addition to the inter-
views and follow-up interviews the researchers
had 25 meetings with members of the Australian
and US organizations, 10 and 15, respectively.
The additional meetings were at formal and infor-
mal gatherings. The more formal meetings allowed
us to see participants fulfilling their official roles
throughout the various parts of the organization
as they interacted in response to the MCS. The
more informal meetings, often after work hours
in casual settings, provided a rich source of some-
what more ‘confidential’, ‘behind the scenes’ infor-
mation, as well as a sense of the attitudes of many
to the changing managerial orientation and their
inherent beliefs to the changes confronting them.
In some cases the informal meetings approximated
formal interviews in terms of the form and content
of data collection. However, if two researchers
were not present the interaction was not counted
as an interview.
Other sources of data were internal archival
material and public records:
• We were allowed supervised access to a wide
array of internal documents that related to theearly design stages and the pilot stage, roll out
of the systems and the ‘in-service’ stage fol-
lowed by atrophy, and the renewal period.
• We were given access to documents that related
more broadly to the objectives of change, train-
ing sessions and activities that were connected
with both technical and organizational aspects
of the change initiatives.
• We visited operational sites to observe docu-
ments and procedures used by managers that
related to both the MCS initiatives and other
administrative matters.
• A wide variety of documents related to official
government policy were examined.
• Given the innovative nature of the MCS initia-
tives, there were press releases and professional
accounting and management conference presen-
tations from defence personnel that were perti-
nent to the study.
Finally, there was some limited information
gained from attending management meetings, for-
ums and change management sessions. Most of this
material involved militarily sensitive information
and is reported only in general terms. We also took
the opportunity during site visits to observe man-
agers’ actions related to how they were responding
to the demands of the change initiatives.
Data analysis
Data were analyzed following methods recom-
mended by Eisenhardt (1989) and as recently
employed by Ahrens and Chapman (2004). This
approach uses an iterative process involving vali-
dation of data, identification of emerging themes
and interpreting our data in terms of the holistic
change model. Interview data from all sources
were organized around the historical record of
the change initiative. Areas of agreement and dis-
agreement were noted with contrasting views iden-
tified. Archival records were linked to the
historical events and provided a source to clarify
or raise questions about points of contention from
interviews. Public documents and the record of
seminars and press interviews often provided a
useful basis to prompt those interviewed as to crit-
ical events impacting the change initiatives. This
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record. We used the documents as the basis for dis-
cussion with key participants to assess the accu-
racy of our research into events over the change
period. Also, the information in these working
documents was used to discuss with key partici-
pants the strengths and weaknesses of the change
initiatives. This provided a valuable source for
them to reflect on the overall progress of the two
organizations’ change initiatives, highlighting
points of similarity and differences. We organized
several meetings where these reflections were
shared. This process provided the basis to identify,
discuss and investigate emerging themes. Finally,
we used these working reports to investigate
whether the events could usefully be described in
terms of Huy’s (2001) modes of planned change.Discussion and findings
In this section we present our findings and dis-
cuss those findings using Huy’s model.
Australian organization
In Australia, early in the 1990s government
pressure resulted in what headquarters and opera-
tional managers in the field said was a surprise clo-
sure of several facilities in the Australian
organization. As a consequence, senior defence
management recognized it needed to convince gov-
ernment that it understood the resources required
to deliver on agreed defence policy. Importantly,
management sought to demonstrate that it was
alert to the costs of conducting defence operations
and that it could provide evidence of the pitfalls of
resource cutbacks.14 A common theme in the inter-
views was that existing budgeting and other
accounting systems did not provide relevant infor-
mation to manage resources and costs, nor was
there confidence in the accuracy and validity of
the existing information systems. ABCM had
gained popularity in the private sector and was
identified as a MCS technique to identify resources14 Australian Case Roundtable, 12 December 1994, p. 2.associated with the activities of delivering agreed
defence outputs. ABCM was seen as providing a
platform to change from a military to a managerial
styled administration. At the time the Australian
organization was seen as being on the cutting edge
of bringing ABCM into the government sector.
The original project leader and other senior mem-
bers of the ABCM team were active in making
presentations at professional accounting and man-
agement conferences and workshops. During the
early stage of the implementation, the project lea-
der was considered at the forefront of public sector
applications of ABCM, being a keynote speaker at
the 1994 National Conference of an Australian
management accounting professional group and
presented regularly at workshops over the period
1994–96. The change process within the Australian
organization involved three distinct stages: (1) ini-
tial researching, defining, and pilot testing, (2) roll-
out of the system culminating in atrophy of the
system, and (3) renewal. By atrophy we mean a
decline in interest in the initiative and a wasting
away of effort. Table 3 presents the stages and
their timing.First stage – Defining
Given the novelty of ABCM to defence, an ini-
tial stage involved a four-year period (1993–97) of
researching, defining and pilot testing the systems.
During this stage, it was important to plan for
change that would have highly visible activities
and outcomes and to demonstrate them quickly.
This was significant given the context of consider-
able pressure from government to demonstrate a
movement away from the military styled adminis-
tration to a managerial orientation with an initial
emphasis on developing cost consciousness. The
director of the project stated that he believed that
ABCM would provide the technical basis for
change.15 Given the urgency to justify the invest-
ment made in ABCM there was time pressure on
the designers of the systems to develop, test and
hand over operational systems that could be used15 The interviews were not recorded. However, comments
captured in the interview notes of both researchers and used in
the text are in italics.
Table 3
Stages of the implementation
Australian US
1993–1997 Researching, defining, pilot testing the systems 1995–1996 Researching
1998–2000 Roll-out 1997–2000 Pilot-testing
2001–2004 Renewal 2001–2004 Renewal
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working on the project, and the engaged consul-
tants, said that there was a real sense of urgency
to produce results. The technical nature of the
ABCM required a comprehensive change in the
formal structuring of data collection and method-
ology applied to MCS systems design. External
consultants were employed to assist in defining
issues related to designing and implementing the
systems and positioning them within a change
management strategy. As the project was being
scoped, managers who would be involved were
consulted and made aware of developments. How-
ever, this process did not engage potential users in
discussions as to how the systems would help them
manage their operations. Nor was it clear to these
managers how the systems would be integrated
with a change management strategy. The manager
of the largest facility noted it was not clear to me
that these new systems would help me manage this
operation. It might be useful for Canberra (Head
Quarters) but not for me. At this stage there was
much activity with extensive resources being
applied to researching the requirements related to
data and design issues. The systems design
involved a broad scoping, high levels of detail
and considerable complexity.
For ABCM, understanding work processes is
an essential part of the analytical practice of relat-
ing costs to activities and processes. Again, exter-
nal consultants lead the analysis of work
processes, data mapping and activity analysis.
Teams of task analysts were sent to operational
facilities and took responsibility for analyzing
work processes and designing systems. Because
of the complexity of the task and the highly
detailed level of analysis, the effort extended over
four years.
Operational staff explained that the work pro-
cess analysis was undertaken at an extremelydetailed level and that they did not fully understand
the purpose of the initiative, or how it related to
their work. A senior member of the work-process
team indicated that the teams did not see that they
should, or could, assess managers’ capabilities to use
the systems. He also confirmed that there was little
support for managers in how to use the cost systems.
The intervention progressed at a relatively slow
pace without visible results. Notably, it could not
be demonstrated that ABCM was being effective
in leading the organization towards a more mana-
gerial orientation. Early participants in the ABCM
initiative claimed that with more tightly specified
deliverables, the project would have had checks to
control for the scope creep that resulted in some
drift in the content and timing of the initiative.
Examples of the scope creep included work done
that related to improving human resource activi-
ties such as remuneration and in improving sched-
uling of parts and services. When interviewed in
2003, the manager of the initial phase of the
ABCM initiative commented that the only way
ABCM would (and could) have been effective is if
the imperative involved coercion. He stated that
his efforts to employ non-coercive leadership had
been a key to lack of take up of the systems and final
atrophy. External consultants involved in ABCM
design and other consultants engaged to facilitate
training confirmed that a lack of coercion inhib-
ited managerial take-up of the ABCM initiative
by the operational managers. According to the
manager of the initial phase of the initiative, while
top management provided verbal support for the ini-
tiatives, there was no active and visible support by
way of them indicating an interest in when and
how they might use the systems, or in how the sys-
tems were being used by others.
There was a growing urgency to demonstrate
benefits as the time period for design became
somewhat protracted. A pilot study was completed
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period from late 1997 until early 1998. The systems
were deemed to be ‘in-service’ early in 1998. Sev-
eral individuals from the design team stated that
‘roll out’ was premature as the systems were still
prototypes but were being offered as fully functional
systems.
In terms of Huy’s (2001) framework the initial
change effort was an organization-wide command-
ing intervention complemented with an engineer-
ing intervention. Huy’s theory of planned change
stresses the importance to effective implementation
of combining and sequencing different intervention
modes. Like the commanding intervention, the
engineering intervention has a focus on rationally
inducing tangible elements of change. The com-
manding intervention involves the overall plan
for change and focuses on structures and systems,
while the engineering intervention focuses on ana-
lyzing work processes. Arguments for engineering
interventions to be combined or precede com-
manding interventions center on the belief that
engineering sensitizes individuals to think about
processes and costs. Given this preparation, it is
more likely that there will be an unambiguous
understanding of the purpose of change between
operational managers and senior change leader-
ship. With this coupling of meaning, the com-
manding intervention can force the pace of
change and operational managers can see how
improvements in work processes relate to the
objectives of the commanding mode. However, in
the Australian case the commanding mode did
not produce fast improvements, did not achieve
near-term change outcomes, was not entrained
by outside factors, and was not monitored in
quantitative clock time. As predicted by Huy, the
commanding mode was not effective in implement-
ing the ABCM-based change initiative with the
development taking three years. Even then the
resulting product was not complete, being based
on a prototype. The work process analysis had
the characteristics of an engineering intervention
as described in Table 1. However, it was apparent
that the engineering intervention was not success-
ful in sensitizing operational managers to how
costing related to work processes, nor how work
processes related to the aims of the commandingmode. The work-process analysis was highly com-
plex and protracted. The work process teams did
not attempt to relate the analysis to operational
managers’ work. Moreover, scope creep resulted
in a drift of the project from its original aims to
move the organization to a more cost conscious
capability that would assist managers in justifying
their resource requirement. Given the complexity
of the engineering intervention, it seems, with
hindsight, that the process analysis would be
protracted.
Our data indicate that a consequence of com-
bining an imperfect commanding and a complex
engineering intervention was the rapid domination
by the engineering intervention. By emphasizing
an engineering intervention, the change managers
could demonstrate that the organization was busy
analyzing and understanding work processes. This
produced a series of engineering-based outcomes.
For a period of time there was less pressure from
senior management, who had a focus on the com-
manding intervention, to demand evidence of pro-
gress towards the organization-wide changes to a
more managerial organization. However, eventu-
ally it was apparent that the initial expectations
of the commanding intervention were not being
effected. There was virtually no take up of the sys-
tems, and the change initiative atrophied. This
observation supports Huy’s (2001) claim that the
application of multiple intervention types gener-
ates potential pacing difficulties as different modes
have different rhythms. Our data suggest that the
slower pacing required for the highly complex
engineering intervention did not match the faster
pacing required for the commanding intervention.
This mismatch in the phasing and the delays
caused by the time consuming process of collecting
information from the engineering intervention
resulted in a number of negative outcomes. Impor-
tantly, the organization was not able to deliver the
fast paced, highly visible outcomes necessary for
an effective commanding intervention. Addition-
ally, given the long period of time involved in the
engineering intervention, some individuals who
were part of the early commanding and engineer-
ing interventions were moved to other positions.
This resulted in new personnel being confronted
with the ABCM change initiative who had no
618 R.H. Chenhall, K.J. Euske / Accounting, Organizations and Society 32 (2007) 601–637experience with the early commanding mode. Con-
sistent with the Huy model, this appears to have
resulted in increased resentment and resistance
by those who were affected by the engineering
intervention but had no experience with the expec-
tations of the earlier commanding mode.
Second stage – Roll-out
The roll-out initiated the second stage. At roll-
out external training consultants were engaged to
encourage acceptance of the technical systems.
They lead workshops and training sessions aimed
at changing the fundamental beliefs of managers
towards accepting a managerial orientation, based
on the ABCM systems. However, the consultants
leading the work process analysis and those doing
the training did not coordinate. Without this coor-
dination those teaching could not relate their
efforts to the work situation and had to use hypo-
thetical examples in an attempt to move managers
cognitively from their military orientation to a
managerial focus. None of the interviewees indi-
cated that these initiatives changed attitudes and
values of personnel. One manager’s comments
capture their frustration with the teaching activi-
ties, the training programs were a waste of time as
we could not see their relevance to anything that
we were doing . . . looking at change management in
a commercial airline was not very instructive. The
effort was discontinued after six months. The work
process analysis continued during the period of the
workshops and training sessions.
Ideally, a teaching intervention involves exter-
nal change agents uncovering past beliefs and
reconstituting these within the preferred change
initiative, through retrospective sense-making
(Weick, 1979). Such a process requires teaching
programs to uncover the past and current work
processes and practices. Combining an engineering
intervention, that exposes the way work is done
and should be done, with a teaching intervention
provides an ideal way of engaging in retrospective
sense-making. This did not occur because the
external engineering and teaching change agents
did not coordinate or engage in a common
approach to the change initiatives. The use of the
hypothetical examples in the teaching intervention
did not provide the local relevance to support theprocess of learning that involves individuals going
back and forth between their own experiences and
those required by the change initiative. Huy (2001,
p. 608) notes the teaching intervention involves
reliving the past and pre-living the future in the
present. This process involves a pace of change
that is individualized and gradual. A lack of sym-
biotic interaction between teaching and engineer-
ing interventions inhibited the teaching from
effectively engaging managers in learning to
change values and beliefs in ways that made sense
to them.
After two years the initiatives suffered unex-
pected atrophy. This lead to a view expressed by
managers at headquarters and at the operational
commands that the ABCM initiative was not of
use to managers, culminating in a recognition at
headquarters that the systems were ineffective as a
platform for change. Over the period 1998 until
2001, the work process analysis continued but in
terms of special projects including the develop-
ment of performance measurement systems. There
was some training aimed at providing managers
with technical understanding of the ABCM. Over
this period, managers typically questioned training
in terms of relevance for their jobs. Most business
managers stressed that they could not see the rele-
vance of ABCM to them, often stating ‘‘What’s in
it for me’’? The initial project leader confirmed that
this type of response was common during the
implementation. Managers also spoke of the
extensive time required to respond to the requests
for data from the ABCM team and training pro-
grams with little focus on the potential usefulness
of the systems for their work. Given that many
managers originally involved in the earlier stages
had been redeployed, new managers were dealing
with the ABCM initiative with no experience of
the previous implementation efforts. At this stage
most managers were confused as to how the new
systems would assist them. One of the operational
managers stated he suffered stress and conflict as he
tried to match his own way of managing while reluc-
tantly and passively cooperating with the require-
ments of the change initiatives. Others said they
were simply able to ignore the initiative.
A notable experience was the success of ABCM
in one operational command of the organization,
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the Command A manager of the ABCM effort
the group faced the situation where it had to spend
more on logistics support than they received in
annual funding. This was confirmed by managers
at headquarters. It was clear to the group’s manag-
ers that the funding short-fall would compromise
the unit’s ability to perform effectively. An individ-
ual who had been on the broader organization’s
ABCM design team was seconded to the group
to lead an analysis of the work process. The Com-
mand A manager and the ABCM expert said that
they believed that through social interactions within
their group changes in the way of doing business
were being achieved. The Command A manager
and his expert were already committed to work
process changes. Other interviewees reported that
the Command A manager and the ABCM expert
were seen as having a commitment to learning how
ABCM could help the managers of Command A
manage more effectively. A manager at Command
A noted that as a consequence of applying ABCM
they were able to appropriately support their capa-
bility, gaining an increase in baseline logistic fund-
ing of 20–25%. A consequence of this success was
that this unit championed the cause of ABCM
and demonstrated a significant change to a more
cost conscious, managerial type of organization.
However, the project leader stated that it was the
view of managers at other operational commands
within the organization that ABCM was relevant
to this unit as it was different. The difference
appears to have been in the pressure facing the unit
not to be able to provide logistic support and the
positive dispositions of the Command A manager
and ABCM expert to the new systems. The inter-
view data indicated that it was not obvious to
the work process and training consultants or the
ABCM team that Command A’s activities were
different in any systematic way to make ABCM
more or less appropriate. We came to the same
conclusion.
The effort by Command A to address the exter-
nal budget pressure can be characterized as a
socializing intervention. Socializing is an impor-
tant intervention mode in Huy’s model. Socializing
is distinguished from the other modes as it
addresses, directly, personal interrelationshipsbetween organizational members, involving
changes in relational behaviors as a precursor to
changing values. In a sense, it is often the least
planned of the interventions requiring organic
social facilitation, often by organizational mem-
bers, rather than external consultants. The success
of the socializing mode in Command A attests to
the effectiveness of this approach. In this case the
socializing intervention preceded and facilitated
the engineering and teaching modes within the
unit. A central factor in the success was the posi-
tive dispositions and close working relationship
between the Command A manager and the indi-
vidual advising on the engineering intervention
of analyzing the work processes. Without these
positive dispositions among other managers
throughout the entire organization, the effective-
ness of this combination of intervention modes
was not transferable to other parts of the organiza-
tion. Other operating managers, the ABCM pro-
ject leader, and members of the ABCM project
team all alluded to the positive disposition of the
Command A manager.
It is instructive to reflect on how the socializing
intervention worked within a situation of extreme
pressure from budgetary constraints and the con-
sequent emphasis on quantitative time pressure
to respond to budgetary cut backs. Given the posi-
tive predispositions and the expertise of the change
group, their qualitative time to change values and
beliefs to a managerial orientation was sufficiently
short to enable them to satisfy the clock time
requirements for developing and implementing
the ABCM systems. This enabled them to respond
rapidly with convincing arguments to gain addi-
tional resources in a setting of budgetary coercion.
Third stage – Renewal
By 2001, ABCM had effectively atrophied in
terms of its original aims. To many in the organi-
zation it appeared that ABCM had been aban-
doned. The organization faced a decision to
disband the ABCM initiative. A new manager of
a reduced ABCM team was appointed by senior
management and instructed to evaluate the sys-
tems with a view to recommending whether or
not to continue with the system. At about the same
time a new chief financial officer (CFO) was
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agement and costing in another arm of the defence
forces. In a special report to his superiors, the new
ABCM manager outlined the problems that had
occurred with implementation and some of the
issues associated with data and design complex-
ity.16 However, he recommended that the original
objectives of the ABCM system could be achieved.
This would need considerable effort to convince
operating managers of the benefits to them of the
ABCM systems. With the strong support of
the CFO and approval from senior management,
the new ABCM manager sought to revive the
effort. The new ABCM manager was respected
widely by both uniformed and civilian personnel,
due to his military background (he was a uni-
formed officer), his recent training in management
by way of an MBA and his persuasive personality,
energy and enthusiasm. According to one of the
operational managers there were high levels of
innate trust between the new, uniformed ABCM
manager and operational personnel. This observa-
tion was supported by the comments of the other
operational managers.
During the renewal stage the new ABCM man-
ager spent a considerable amount of time in the
field listening to the concerns of operational man-
agers and discussing how the systems could be of
benefit to the managers. He estimated that he
spent about 40% of his time on this effort. A dis-
tinctive aspect of these interactions was the close
relationship between the ABCM manager and
operational managers. This was based, in part,
on the perspective of the ABCM manager derived
from his empathy with the culture of the organiza-
tion, his understanding of the history of the
ABCM implementation and his belief in the poten-
tial benefits of ABCM. These close attachments
enabled the ABCM manager to develop an under-
standing of which managers would likely have dif-
ficulty in accepting the more managerial values
embedded within the ABCM application. He said
his attempts to convince these managers involved
considerable effort, always targeted specifically on16 An evaluation of the ABCM initiative: Final Report, June
2001.the work in their areas. This did slow the renewal
phase as some managers required considerable
time to accept the new values. While the extensive
cooperative process of engaging with operational
managers appears to have been effective for most
managers there was a minority who remained
recalcitrant.
Senior management expressed that they
believed that by the later part of 2004 considerable
progress had been made in engaging operational
managers in discussion and discourse as to the
potential benefits of ABCM. Members of the
ABCM team and the CFO stated that they believed
that most managers had been convinced as to the
potential for ABCM to assist them, at least on spe-
cial projects. Training was revived with national
workshops to highlight progress and further
engage managers in the potential benefits of
ABCM. Importantly, these sessions focused on
the activities of the operational managers. At the
same time the ABCM team was making progress
in simplifying the basic methodology, matching
data to the methodology and validating the model.
Members of the ABCM team expressed the idea
that progress in these areas was essential to a com-
prehensive take-up of the systems. A member of
the team stated that from prior experiences they
saw that overly complex systems with unreliable
data can seriously undermine perceptions as to the
usefulness of ABCM, even given positive attitudes
to the systems.
While progress had been made over the renewal
stage in developing a discourse about the benefits
of ABCM with many managers indicating enthusi-
asm for ABCM, it was still unclear if the organiza-
tion was committed to ABCM as the basis for
change. Certainly, it was a considerable challenge
to move the failed systems to a rejuvenated effort.
At the close of the research period a senior opera-
tional appointment was made of an individual who
rapidly claimed ownership of ABCM. He might
help effect the rejuvenation of the systems, as he
was requiring all reports and resource applications
to be based on ABCM.
The new ABCM manager had initiated a social-
izing intervention. The process of the socializing
intervention demonstrated how personal values
could be changed by paying attention to social
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somewhat simplified, engineering intervention.
The required social bonding for socializing inter-
ventions to be effective was accomplished by way
of close personal communication and support.
During the early period of this stage, socializing
was the dominant form of intervention. After
about 18 months, socializing was complemented
with teaching and engineering interventions that
were refocused on the objectives of the change pro-
gram to move towards a managerial orientation.
The combination of teaching and engineering
appeared to assist in helping drive the socializing
intervention. It particularly helped the ABCM
manager socialize with managers who were critical
of the prior attempts at engineering and teaching.
Also, after a period of socializing operational
managers were more committed to expending their
resources to provide data to the work-process indi-
viduals. Progress on socializing and engineering
appeared to have synergistic effects on acceptance
of the ABCM program. One manager who had
been negative in his comments of the early ABCM
initiative claimed that the new simplified ABCM
approach made sense and he was looking forward
to working with the systems, given the data used
by the system would be compatible with the formal
reporting requirements. Importantly, this combined
intervention was given sufficient time to be
effected. The timing of these interventions was very
much dependant on an assessment of how effective
the socializing had been at various points across
the organization. During this stage a commanding
intervention was not employed. However, the
recent appointment of a senior manager at a key
operational installation who was committed to
ABCM may provide elements of a commanding
intervention to the change initiative.
US organization
In the US organization, a number of govern-
ment improvement initiatives and statutes, such
as the Chief Financial Officers Act (1990), Govern-
ment Performance and Results Act (1993), the
Government Management and Reform Act
(1994), and the Clinger-Cohen Act (1996) helped
to focus the US organization on providingaccountability in terms of costs related to perfor-
mance outcomes. As in the Australian organiza-
tion, three stages were identified (see Table 3).
First stage – Researching
In 1995, motivated by strong external forces,
notably legislated mandates and external budget-
ing requirements, one of the senior managers
described how he initiated an effort to address the
inability of the existing program budgeting model
to provide meaningful costs. As in the Australian
case, the growing popularity of ABCM and its
potential to help understand costs was recognized
by senior management. One of the senior managers
in charge of budgeting was a leader in an interna-
tional professional accounting society with thou-
sands of predominately private sector members.
The society was actively involved in various
ABCM educational and research efforts. He said
he saw the value in improving the tracking of costs
through the use of ABCM but he could not sell it to
the organization as pure cost measurement. How-
ever, the requirements of GPRA (Government Per-
formance and Results Act), increasing missions,
and declining budgets provided a reason to imple-
ment ABCM. The senior manager directed the
reexamination of the efficacy of program budgeting
and the potential of ABCM to improve under-
standing of costs. At that time another senior oper-
ational manager, located at headquarters, was
actively seeking to address the decline in resources
and the need to develop better cost information to
meaningfully implement the Government Perfor-
mance and Results Act. The senior manager in
the operational segment said that he had learned
about ABCM through studying the Baldrige Award
criteria to meet GPRA requirements. Their com-
bined efforts in sponsoring the project, with the
support of another senior headquarters manager,
culminated in a decision to adopt ABCM in a seg-
ment of the organization that accounted for about
30% of the organization’s costs.
The US organization used a focused command-
ing intervention driven by strong environmental
imperatives. It did not have a blended or combined
intervention during the researching stage. The
intervention produced fast, visible and near-term
outcomes identified in terms of quantitative time.
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the pilot study at two sites and to engage a consult-
ing firm to help with the implementation occurred,
quickly.
Second stage – Pilot-testing
In 1997 the second stage started with the initia-
tion of an ABCM implementation. A largely in-
house implementation was designed to be executed
on a well-defined schedule. External consultants
were used to assist in the implementation process.
These consultants surveyed all of the relevant com-
mands in an attempt to capture the activities
related to work processes and developed an activ-
ity dictionary for the commands. According to the
consultant who led the effort and the three senior
managers, the effort was complicated as the work
processes were not standard across or within the
studied segments. Moreover, the consultant said
that in addition to this process variability, knowl-
edge of the resources needed to accomplish specific
activities was based on the professional judgment
of the local managers (i.e., managers in the opera-
tional segment of the organization not at head-
quarters). These local managers had high levels
of autonomy and were accustomed to adjusting
their schedules to adapt to these situations and try-
ing to balance the demands on their time. The
local managers agreed with the consultant’s com-
ments. One of the local managers said that each
mission is basically unique and the officer in charge
of a mission has to make decisions as events
occurred. The situation of high task complexity
and structural autonomy presented challenges to
effect the process analysis.
Two sites were chosen to test the ABCM model.
Given the tradition of relatively autonomous local
management, individuals who were at the sites told
us that they had initial concerns that the new system
would both impinge on their freedom to execute
their function properly and that the systems would
facilitate micro-management of the field sites by
senior management. The implementation had clear
directions and an emphasis on timely and visible
deliverables. The ABCM model required changes
in the formal structure of data collection. Officers
who were stationed at the sites at the time of test-
ing the model said that the system involved manag-ers at the field sites spending a considerable amount
of time on data tracking and entry. One of the offi-
cers gave the example of the considerable amount
of additional time spent to validate labor use and
hours against a number of different activities. Not-
withstanding the potential for this work to delay
implementation, managers and their staff
responded and the implementation was able to
show timely, highly visible results related to under-
standing work processes and building activity dic-
tionaries. Training sessions on how to input data
were provided by consultants. These sessions
assisted managers to develop an understanding
of the ABCM system. However, training on uses
of the data and the overall purposes of the ABCM
change initiative was not provided.
The initial outcomes of the second stage were
mixed. According to one of the senior sponsoring
managers, during the testing period at the two com-
mands, the ABCM system did prove to be beneficial
to local managers, particularly in helping them to
provide, for the first time, meaningful responses to
questions from headquarters and other sources on
resource allocation and use. However, according
to the managers who were stationed at the test
sites, the feeling at the local level appeared to be
that the system was not only conceived by head-
quarters but it was only of value to headquarters.
One of these managers stated that headquarters
apparently saw value in the system and may have
gotten some value out of it. That value was never
translated to the operational level. In 1999, after
the models had been in use for about a year, the
three senior managers at headquarters, who were
promoting the new MCS, were transferred from
headquarters into the field. Without their direction
and their ability to encourage and direct managers
to work with ABCM, the system atrophied by
early 2000.
In terms of Huy’s framework, the commanding
intervention was continued from the researching
stage into the pilot-testing stage. The implementa-
tion model for ABCM was developed by the three
senior headquarters managers who were advocates
for the new MCS. The new MCS was rapidly
deployed and quickly used at the two test sites.
This satisfied the commanding intervention’s
requirements for fast, visible and near-term out-
17 We interviewed two of the three senior managers. The third
reviewed our written results and agreed with what was stated in
the paper.
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commanding intervention suffered a serious inter-
ruption as the three key senior personnel were
transferred to other duties before they had time
to convince other managers to continue with the
commanding intervention. An engineering inter-
vention to identify activities and processes sup-
ported the commanding intervention. The US
organization employed a strong commanding
intervention that provided a context for a focused
engineering application for the new MCS. This
facilitated a pacing for the engineering interven-
tion that was sufficiently rapid to match the needs
of the commanding intervention for fast, visible
outcomes.
It is possible that the command driven imple-
mentation would have been a success if key per-
sonnel had remained in place for a sufficient
period of time to provide clear benefits to those
who were actively using the system. Additionally,
the implementation may have succeeded if the
three senior sponsoring managers had convinced
other senior headquarters managers to continue
the commanding intervention. That support could
have set the stage for a socializing intervention to
follow, with the aim of changing the underlying
beliefs given the new behaviors based on the com-
manding intervention. However, with a change in
key leadership the sequencing did not occur.
Third stage – Renewal
The third stage was initiated early in 2001 when
two of the three senior managers who promoted
the initial ABCM effort were reassigned to head-
quarters. The third returned to headquarters in
2002. One returned as chief of staff, one was
in charge of financial systems, and the third was
in charge of risk management for the organization.
Risk management was an initiative to develop an
organization-wide approach to plan for readiness
and evaluate consequent costs.
The continuing impact of legislation, such as
the Government Performance Review Act (1993),
increasing missions and decreasing resources pro-
vided the motivation for the three senior managers
to reintroduce ABCM. As a group, these senior
managers remained convinced that ABCM pro-
vided a means to relate resources to actual out-comes and, in turn, identify the resources needed
for desired outcomes.17 These senior managers
indicated that they saw ABCM as particularly rel-
evant to assist the change necessary for the organi-
zation-wide, risk management initiative. However,
they had learned from their first attempt to imple-
ment ABCM. One of the senior managers said that
they had learnt that if field personnel do not perceive
benefits coming from a new accounting system, it
would only survive as long as it was enforced by
headquarters. They also realized that while the
three of them provided strong top management
leadership a much broader base of acceptance
was required to entrench the change program.
According to the senior managers, it was clear that
they had to develop a broad support base for the
effort. Additionally, they stated that a reorganiza-
tion of the financial functions at headquarters
meant that successful implementation would
require commitment from other leaders at
headquarters.
The senior managers consciously sought to rein-
troduce the ABCM initiative by developing a
change strategy that focused on the longer term.
The intention was to encourage a change in values
and a commitment among managers at headquar-
ters and in the field to a more managerial and cost
conscious approach. One of the senior managers
stressed that while local managers generally were
well intentioned in their efforts at improving effi-
ciency, they were using inappropriate models that
were inconsistent with an organization-wide perspec-
tive. The local or field managers’ focus was on
maximizing effectiveness, given the level of
resources for a specific task or mission, rather than
taking a cross-functional approach to maximize
effectiveness across the tasks of the entire organi-
zation, given total resources. Managers in the field
discussed with us their managerial approach to
achieve the specific missions assigned. In their view
their role was to do the best job they could to meet
specific mission requirements. When asked by us
they said that there had been little attention paid
to the relative efficiencies across mission categories.
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of the narrow mission focus by observing that our
functional orientation is an obstacle to working from
a multi-mission perspective. ABCM combined with
risk management was seen by the three senior
managers as a technique that could help foster
the acceptance of a model that balanced resource
planning with efficiency trade-offs across mission
areas to support overall organizational effective-
ness. At a meeting with two of the three senior
managers, the managers used the CAM-I Cross
to demonstrate the usefulness of ABCM. Fig. 1
depicts the CAM-I cross. The vertical axis pro-
vided the cost tracking while the horizontal axis
provided a means to match resources with pro-
cesses and outputs.
Initial implementation efforts sought to instruct
managers in the preferred organizational-wide
managerial orientation. However, the senior man-
agers stated that they recognized that achieving
long-term success would require new attitudes to
be entrenched at the local level. The senior manag-
ers said that change agents at the local level would
be required to shift attitudes away from the
entrenched local mission focus to the preferred orga-
nization-wide approach. Junior officers specializing
in financial management, who had recently
received their MBAs, or a similar degree, were
identified as the individuals who would be devel-
oped as the change agents. Their education pro-














Fig. 1. CAM-I cross.and analytic training to both understand the logic
of the change effort and the potential usefulness of
ABCM in the overall effort. Based on the research-
ers’ observations of and discussion with the junior
officers over a two year period and the statements
of the three senior managers, it appears that each
junior officer had a strong disposition to learn
about enhanced MCS modeling and a proclivity
to change her or his management style to a more
managerial, cost conscious orientation.
As one senior officer pointed out, there was
additional motivation for these managers to embrace
the new initiatives. For their part, the junior officers
became part of a project that could fundamentally
change their organization and offered them an
opportunity to have exposure to and influence the
most senior managers of the service. In informal
conversations with several of the junior officers,
they concurred that their individual efforts on the
initiative were highly visible to the organizations
senior leaders and that the initiative could have a
very real impact on the organization and their
individual careers. As the effort progressed the
group became known inside the organization as
the ‘MBAs with attitude’.
The junior officers had assignments at various
installations across the US. In an attempt to bring
some cohesion and focus to this geographically
dispersed group, the manager of financial systems
from the senior team described how he used both
regular financial management meetings within the
organization and professional meetings as forums
for discussion and debate around ABCM concepts
and implementation. To develop a coherent
ABCM focus, the senior manager brought the
junior officers to the quarterly meetings of a lead-
ing research consortium that focuses on cost man-
agement issues. As a group, the members of the
research consortium had decades of experience in
designing and implementing ABCM and other
cost management techniques. These meetings
became recurring rituals that provided the time
for the junior officers to build a shared under-
standing of ABCM, to identify what it could mean
to their organization and how it could be imple-
mented. According to one of the senior managers,
the meetings were not only helping the junior officers
develop a common understanding of ABCM but had
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financial managers of the organization to how man-
agers from the private sector deal with issues of effi-
ciency and effectiveness. From the perspective of
one junior officer, the regular meetings (with the
other junior officers) made it easier to understand
how ABCM applied to us. Another commented
that the research consortium meetings exposed
me to ideas that are not very common in my
environment.
As the initiative evolved with its decentralized
focus, a number of relatively small and unique
models were developed within various differenti-
ated organizational segments. One junior officer
stationed at a field site noted that more direction
from headquarters would be useful but without it
we (the junior officers) have more freedom to oper-
ate. Rather than try to force a coordinated
approach by mandating the adoption of a central-
ized model, the senior managers sought to achieve
co-ordination in an incremental way by encourag-
ing managers to learn from each other. One of the
junior officers (i.e., an MBA with attitude) was sta-
tioned at headquarters. One of his assigned tasks
was to help the other junior officers at the field
commands in developing their models. The goal
was to develop relatively simple, local models to
whet the appetite of the users so that they would
ask for more from the models thereby supporting
and encouraging their development. These models
were discussed at regular meetings of personnel
with a consequence of a sharing of ideas and the
gradual emergence of a relatively common model.
These models, in effect, became the means for
other personnel across the organization to discuss
and debate the merits of the new systems and to
identify their taken for granted assumptions and
understand the logic of the organizational effec-
tiveness model. With this understanding, the mod-
els themselves then began to spread across the
organization. As this diffusion progressed, there
was an increasing need to ensure compatibility
among the models if effectiveness of the ABCM
initiative across all segments of the organization
was to be assessed. Given the development of a rel-
atively common focus among the different devel-
opers of the models and the support of the
junior officer at headquarters, the challenge of dis-seminating the change initiative in an integrated
way was likely to be less than if a number of truly
independent implementations had occurred.
The role of the junior officers evolved during
the implementation. Initially, they were used to
help the members of the organization to under-
stand the ABCM initiative. Later, they were, in
effect, acting as process consultants and action
researchers, elsewhere in their organizational seg-
ments, to implement ABCM models. This, in part,
provided the energy and continuing motivation to
work to change beliefs at the local level. Illustra-
tive of their commitment is that the junior officers
at the local level said that their efforts in imple-
menting ABCM, were almost totally over and
above their regular duties. As one of the junior
officers stated there is my normal monthly produc-
tion that is required. Anything I do to advance this
project is over and above those requirements.
Another commented that anything I do on this pro-
ject is out of hide. A third commented that all of us
(the junior officers) have day jobs, anything we do
on the ABCM project is in addition to our normal
assignments.
At the renewal stage a combined socializing and
teaching intervention was evident. The use of
training sessions and conferences to encourage
socialization during this stage was largely effective
among the junior officers because of the strong dis-
positions of the senior managers and the junior
officers towards the new values embedded in the
move to a more managerial way of administering
the organization. These dispositions were derived
from the educational background of the individu-
als and their enthusiasm for new initiatives. An
additional motivation was for the junior officers
to be perceived as part of a group that were up
to date with modern management, for promotion
purposes. The training sessions and conferences
also involved a teaching intervention in which
senior managers guided junior managers towards
changed values.
In both organizations the motivation to employ
MCS to help effect a change from a military to a
managerial orientation derived from external
political pressure for the organizations to be more
accountable and more professional in their use of
resources. The growing popularity of ABCM in
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employ this technique to help effect change. While
this initial adoption may be explained in terms of
fashion, senior managers did not appear to have
lost faith, over the 10 years of the study, in the
potential of the technique to assist in providing
valuable information critical to their change initia-
tives. The key issue over the duration of the project
had been how to implement the systems to gain
buy-in by operational managers.Comparative analysis and conclusions
In the previous section we presented the find-
ings regarding the role of MCS in the change pro-
cess within the two military organizations and
analyzed it from the perspective of Huy’s model.
A summary of the findings is presented in Table
4. In this section, we continue the discussion of
the implementation process using Huy’s model.
We use the data from both organizations to draw
some conclusions on the ways in which the four
intervention modes were combined and sequenced.
In doing so, we examine relevant assumptions,
both temporal and non-temporal, of the interven-
tion types. Also, we show how Huy’s framework
of effective planned change requires consideration
of situational factors such as the extent of pressure
from the external environment, the extensiveness
of the change (organizational or local initiatives),
the complexity of the work situation, the level of
structural autonomy and personal dispositions to
change. These factors evolved through time.
In essence, Huy proposes that large-scale
change involves the enactment of multiple ideal
intervention types: commanding, engineering,
teaching and socializing. The effectiveness of
applying these ideal types depends largely on
which modes are combined, the timing of the inter-
ventions, and the pace of change. We found that
while each organization aimed to effect change
by implementing ABCM, they combined and
sequenced the interventions in different ways.
Huy (2001, p. 610) stresses that it is the effective-
ness of combining and sequencing interventions
that provides organizations with a ‘temporal
capacity’ to manage the process of change. Tem-poral capacity provides for an effective integration
of the different pacing requirements embedded
within the different modes. For example, temporal
capacity is evident when the fast pacing of a com-
manding mode is effectively combined with the
engineering mode that is constrained by the time
required to understand and diagnose work pro-
cesses. Both of our research sites provide evidence
of the importance of developing effective temporal
capacity at various times over the ten years of the
study. Perhaps the clearest example of difficulties
with developing temporal capacity in the Austra-
lian case was the inconsistency in managing the
clock time requirements of the commanding inter-
vention with the combination of a slower clock
time for the engineering intervention and qualita-
tive time for teaching and socializing interventions.
Managers were not given sufficient time to buy
into the ABCM initiative. In the US case, consid-
erable flexibility in providing qualitative time was
evident by way of the individualized pacing of
the development of the local models. Each man-
ager was given the qualitative time necessary to
accept the initial change and then request more
until he or she was fully committed.
Initial commanding intervention
The commanding intervention was the first type
applied by both organizations. Our data indicate
that both organizations had an initial intention
of implementing a commanding intervention. The
Australian case was an organization-wide applica-
tion, while the US case involved two test site appli-
cations within decentralized units. The essential
difference relates to the extent of change, with
the Australian case involving a much larger scale.
It is in large-scale change that the comprehensive-
ness of the commanding intervention becomes par-
ticularly important to ensure organization-wide
take up of change programs (Huy, 2001, p. 605).
Our data from both of the organizations supports
Huy’s proposition that the commanding mode is
unlikely to be effective unless there is close supervi-
sion and the mode delivers fast, highly visible and
regular outcomes.
One of the non-temporal assumptions for the
commanding intervention is that top management
Table 4
Australian findings (panel A) and US findings (panel B)
Commanding Engineering Teaching Socializing
Panel A
Stage one
Activity External pressure to become
managerial




Lack of support for operational
managers
Pressure to provide tangible
output and deliver in-service
systems, prematurely (prototype)
None at this stag None at this stage
Outcome Unchecked scope drift
Lack of visible outcomes
Time pressure from above
Lack of managerial engagement
and support





Activity Lack of cohesive leadership
No external pacing
Lack of active interest of senior
managers
Continuation of work
process analysis but focused










as to relevance to them
and time spent on data
collection and training
Endeavors failed e
to lack of integra n
between engineer
and teaching inte ons
Successful socialization
in a committed section
Not transferable to broader
organization because of
poor dispositions, distrust
in systems and perceived
lack of relevance
Stage three
Activity New committed CFO








Strong socializing influence of
new ABCM manager
Outcome Use by senior CFO of ABCM data






Clearer links to s tegy
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between managers





































































Commanding Engineering Teaching Socializing
Panel B
Stage one
Activity Strong commanding with
scheduled deliverables
None at this stage None at this stage None at this stage
Outcome Visible, timely deliverables
Stage two














None at this stage
Outcome Commanding intervention
ceased with transfer of senior
change managers
Atrophy
Some local benefits but
seen as of value mainly to HQ
As an organizational
intervention, difficulties





Not effective in developin
values or ability to use sy ems
Stage three
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Strong emphasis on teach g
In-house teaching and
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Adoption by junior mana ers
of change agent role




Outcome Recognize need for
broader leadership base
Need for commitment
from others in HQ
Restricted to service areas
Still a decentralized effort
Plans to use engineering to
integrate local efforts (risk
management to play a role)
Managers committed to
ABCM doing work
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vention with ‘‘the use of clear orders and implaca-
ble sanctions to deter disobedience’’ (Huy, 2001, p.
605). In different ways, both organizations demon-
strated how violating this assumption during their
initial implementations led to ineffective outcomes.
The Australian organization did not create a set of
clear orders to use the new system nor were there
sanctions for those who did not do so. Moreover,
indifference from senior management meant that
there was no close personal monitoring to provide
clear orders and sanctions. The US organization
also had not formalized the commanding interven-
tion by way of clear orders and sanctions. While
senior managers were strongly committed, without
this level of formality, their effectiveness was lost
when they were transferred. Thus, it is apparent
that leadership within the commanding interven-
tion was important in both organizations. A lack
of a strong coercive leadership style in the Austra-
lian case and the movement to other duties of the
senior managers of the US case resulted in a lack
of effective entrainment to pace the MCS
implementation.
Combining commanding and engineering
interventions
Huy’s theory of planned change stresses the
importance to effective implementation of combin-
ing and sequencing different intervention modes.
Both organizations provide evidence on the diffi-
culties of combining modes, derived from incom-
patibilities in the timing and pacing of the
modes. In the Australian case, an explanation for
the ineffectiveness of combining commanding and
engineering modes lies in the complexity of the
task which caused the engineering intervention to
take more ‘quantitative’ time than is usual in com-
manding interventions. This disjunction in the
time dimensions of the commanding and engineer-
ing intervention types helps explain why the
change initiative did not progress in ways to satisfy
the requirements of the commanding intervention
for fast improvements. That is, the commanding
intervention needed rapid results but the engineer-
ing intervention was constrained by the complexity
of the work.In the US organization, once the decision was
made to implement a new MCS in the second
(pilot-testing) stage, the commanding intervention
was supported with an engineering intervention to
identify activities and processes. The engineering
intervention was able to provide highly visible
results within the time constraints dictated by the
commanding mode. It is important to note that
this engineering mode was less complex and more
focused than was the case in the Australian
organization.
The experiences of both organizations show
that combining commanding and engineering
interventions requires the pacing of the engineer-
ing intervention to be sufficiently rapid to satisfy
the requirements of the commanding intervention.
It also suggests that a strong commanding inter-
vention can help to ensure that the engineering
intervention avoids problems of scope creep and
lack of focus with the objectives of the change ini-
tiative. Nevertheless, in Huy’s model, the com-
manding and engineering interventions tend not
to lead to institutionalizing the change, or in Huy’s
terminology to ‘deep change’. It is this ‘deep
change’ that is required to ensure that change ini-
tiatives are diffused and sustained. Our data sup-
port the contention that without a change in
managers’ values such ‘deep change’ is unlikely
to occur. In the Australian case, in the main, the
managers were able to ignore the change initiative.
Attempts to change managers’ values to encourage
take up of the new initiatives were attempted
unsuccessfully by implementing a teaching inter-
vention at the second stage (roll-out).
Role of teaching interventions
It seems clear that the teaching intervention in
stage two (roll-out) of the Australian case failed
because of incompatibility with the engineering
intervention. It may be speculated that an
approach that aligned the sequencing and pacing
of teaching with engineering may have had benefi-
cial outcomes and saved the initiative from atro-
phy. Indeed, positive experiences of combining a
teaching with an engineering intervention in the
third stage (renewal) of the project suggest that
this is possible.
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engineering intervention in stage two (pilot testing)
was effective in implementing the pilot program.
However, the managers at the local level did not
adopt values consistent with the change strategy.
It is possible, as in the Australian case, that combin-
ing the commanding-engineering intervention with
a teaching intervention could have afforded the
opportunity for the members of the organization
in the field, and at headquarters, to accept the new
mental managerial model implicit in the system.
Consideration of our data related to the teach-
ing intervention provides evidence to reflect on the
process of phasing the pacing of different interven-
tion modes. As noted above, the sequencing of the
teaching intervention after the initial commanding
and engineering intervention, during stage two
(roll-out) in the Australian organization was an
attempt to help managers develop the mental mod-
els appropriate for the new decision environment.
As Huy (2001) indicates, the slower pacing of the
teaching intervention helps to create a less stressful
rhythm for the organization, following the com-
manding and engineering interventions that typi-
cally involve rapid and stressful change.
However, an assumption for the teaching interven-
tion is the sharing of tacit assumptions and taken-
for-granted cause-effect relationships. This helps
provide the background for the retrospective
sense-making to understanding the current
change. Although the external change agents
implementing the teaching intervention could help
the members of the organization reveal their tacit
assumptions and taken-for-granted cause-effect-
relationships they could not effectively relate those
to the new environment because of a lack of coor-
dination between themselves and the external con-
sultants used for the commanding and engineering
intervention. Although not expressly discussed by
Huy (2001) the coordination among different
external change agents involved in sequenced or
combined intervention types is implicit in the
model. Nevertheless, our data suggest that it may
be beneficial to make this obvious point explicit,
thereby helping avoid potential problems in exe-
cuting multiple interventions.
It is noteworthy that reintroducing the teaching
intervention in the Australian organization duringstage three (renewal) was effective due to the les-
sons drawn from the earlier disconnect between
engineering and teaching consultants. Much had
been learnt from the prolonged engineering inter-
vention about what had to be changed in terms
of work processes. Using this information, the
teaching intervention was highly focused and per-
tinent to managers’ day-to-day activities.
Socializing interventions
Our data suggest that the ease with which Huy’s
socializing intervention can be implemented is
highly dependent on personal predispositions to
the change initiative. However, as indicated previ-
ously, the predispositions for change can be sup-
ported by other interventions and initiatives in
the organization. For instance, in the US organiza-
tion, the risk management initiative and the asso-
ciated teaching intervention provided a strong
technical basis to focus on the new organiza-
tional-wide, managerial-like approach. It also pro-
vided a basis to assist in developing further the
socializing intervention. The idea of teaching indi-
viduals to focus on total organizational effective-
ness, that is minimizing risk and maximizing
readiness, provided in operational terms the cata-
lyst for members of the organization to question
their fundamental beliefs and taken-for-granted
assumptions. From a socializing perspective, the
senior risk manager stated that he placed particu-
lar emphasis on what Huy would describe as
socializing interactions with his peers and superi-
ors. Importantly, the senior risk manager facili-
tated the socializing intervention by arranging
for the junior officers to be placed in situations
that encouraged active discussion and discourse
about ABCM.
Central role of combining interventions
Our study of the role of ABCM within two mil-
itary organizations undergoing change from a mil-
itary to managerial styled administration indicates
how multiple modes of intervention, as identified
by Huy (2001), can help explain the change pro-
cesses involving innovations in MCS. We found
that different modes of intervention were used to
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work processes, and values and behaviors. The
data from the two research sites show how the
intervention types are sequenced and combined.
In some instances, it appears that one intervention
type is dependent on the preceding application of
another. Importantly, it appears that the ideal
types have requisite internal requirements and lack
of attention to these requirements can jeopardize
the change initiatives.
Our data indicate that combining intervention
types becomes complex. The way that the different
modes are sequenced and combined appeared to
be dependent not only on characteristics of the
modes but also on the dispositions of individuals,
which evolve through time. One example of this
is the different scheduling of the engineering mode
in each organization. In the US case, personal dis-
positions towards the ABCM initiative were posi-
tive in stage three (renewal). The combined
teaching-socializing intervention was effective at
the local level. An engineering intervention then
became important to promote compatibility
among the various decentralized ABCM models.
In the Australian case, negative dispositions
towards the ABCM initiative were apparent. So
while the intent at stage two (roll-out) was to
employ an engineering-teaching intervention for
organization-wide change, negative dispositions
lead to a lack of take-up of the systems. It was
not until a socializing mode was employed, with
its focus on changing values to overcome negative
dispositions, that the benefits of a teaching–engi-
neering intervention were effected.
Pacing
It is important to emphasize the central role of
pacing to Huy’s model. Huy notes that significant
change usually requires managers, at all levels, to
accept and adopt new conceptual models. This
requires a gradual pacing that is appropriate for
each individual decision maker. From a financial
and managerial point of view the new models in
the two organizations generated potential conflict
for managers as the models eroded, or at least
altered, the ability of the managers to place current
and future decisions in the same sense-makingcontext. Consequently, it was necessary to accept
that change would come at a pace acceptable to
the individual, not by some prearranged schedule.
When both organizations combined interven-
tion modes it was apparent that temporal incom-
patibility between intervention types caused
implementation problems. In the Australian case,
combining a commanding intervention with a
complex engineering intervention resulted in a pro-
tracted implementation that eroded the ability of
the change agent to deliver the fast paced out-
comes necessary for effective commanding inter-
ventions. In the US, the combination of teaching
and socializing required recognition of the rela-
tively long pacing of the interventions. Both have
qualitative time perspectives that necessitate a rel-
atively long-term approach allowing for change to
happen at its own pace. The key leaders of the
effort facilitated an environment that focused on
the relatively long term allowing the gradual pac-
ing necessary for success. Additionally, one output
of the socializing approach was the development
of change agents from that group who internalized
the new set of behaviors. They exposed diverse ele-
ments of the organization to the new beliefs help-
ing to reveal taken-for-granted-assumptions of
resource generation and use.
Importance of context and structure
Huy stresses that the context of the organiza-
tion is important to understand how change
should be planned. Thus far, we have noted the
importance of the extensiveness of the planned
change, the complexity in understanding the work
processes underlying the engineering intervention
and the role of personal dispositions to acceptance
of the initiatives. The nature of the organizational
structure also appears to be important.
In the US organization, the change initiative was
implemented within a relatively decentralized
structure. The initial failure of the top–down com-
manding intervention made clear to the senior team
of advocates that successful implementation was
not an issue of only meeting centrally determined
time schedules but rather one of shifting mental
models and norms of behavior of the autonomous
managers at the local level. With the renewal of the
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tance of a new way of thinking and acting at the
local level. The senior team of advocates chose a
combined teaching-socializing approach to accom-
plish this end. This lent itself to a more decentral-
ized effort than would have a commanding or
engineering approach that would have involved a
loss of autonomy for the decentralized managers.
Consistent with the decentralized structure, the
ABCM models were developed at the local level
during the third stage (renewal). This provided a
way to support a combined teaching–socializing
intervention at the local level. The models were rel-
atively simple and focused. The expressed intention
was to stimulate the local managers’ appetites with
readily usable and understandable data so the man-
agers would request more or different data from the
model. In other words, it was intended to create ini-
tial information that was readily usable by the local
managers, presuming that they would ask for
more. The intervention relied on a pull implemen-
tation strategy rather than a push strategy, based
on changing the values of the managers to accep-
tance of the ABCM-based change initiative. From
the perspective of the combined teaching–socializa-
tion intervention, the readily usable data lead the
managers to new behaviors and provided opportu-
nities to questioning the decision models they
employed. Given that the managers were in effect
driving the revisions to the ABCMmodels through
their requests, they were provided the temporal
space to adjust their personal decision models
according to their own inner time.
In the Australian case, local managers tended to
restrict their administrative work to centrally
determined processes and procedures. The devel-
opment of localized procedures and processes
was not encouraged. It might be expected that in
such a situation it would be relatively easier than
in the US organization to introduce a new initia-
tive that would be common to all segments and
allow for a close integration between segment
applications. Within Huy’s model, it is the com-
manding intervention that is most clearly compat-
ible with a centralized approach. Several members
of the original ABCM team indicated that they
thought the initial implementation should have
used the centralized structure to force individualsto adopt and use the new systems. However, the
temporal incompatibility of the commanding and
engineering interventions did not lead to success.
Nevertheless, it seems from our data drawn from
both organizations that it is likely that the com-
manding, engineering and teaching innovations
with their unambiguous practices can be employed
readily in either centralized or decentralized
structures.
The question arises if the centralized structure is
an impediment to developing the less directional
and organic orientation of the socializing mode.
Our data from the Australian case suggest that this
is not necessarily the case. Given an enthusiastic
change agent and support from senior manage-
ment, encouraging a socializing mode within seg-
ments of a centralized organization is possible. It
may be necessary for the change agent to be pro-
vided sufficient flexibility to encourage dialogue
and debate about existing and new processes and
systems at the local level. However, this may be
effective even if the processes cut across existing
centralized lines of authority.
Finally, given the aspirations of both organiza-
tions to use MCS to facilitate a change from a mil-
itary to a managerial culture, how did this
initiative developed with other change initiatives
and what were the wider organizational implica-
tions of ABCM related change? Within the Aus-
tralian organization, at about the same time as
the ABCM initiative the broader military was
restructured with assets such as facilities and mate-
rials, that were originally managed by the separate
areas of the armed forces, being placed within a
new division. Given the interdependencies between
this new unit and operational areas, there were
clear implications for developing a comprehensive
ABCM model. It was, however, decided not to
involve the new division in the initiative. While
an initial explanation for this involves rivalries
and territorial claims it is pertinent that the new
‘resources’ division has recently initiated an
ABCM exercise and has elicited the assistance of
the ABCM team from the case organization. It is
also of interest that other arms of the defence force
have developed their own costing models indepen-
dently of each other. There is, however, consider-
able cross fertilization of ideas as the Chief
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year to different arms of the defence force. Thus,
in a somewhat indirect way the lessons learned
from the ABCM initiative in the case organization
have had broader affects elsewhere within that
organization and within the defence force at large.
As is often the case in large public sector organiza-
tions these processes are somewhat slower than
might be found in commercial organizations.
In the US case, the enthusiastic adoption of the
ABCM by the ‘MBAs with attitude’ has meant
that the ABCM has had broader effects on change
as these managers are relocated throughout the
organization and in effect carry the language of
change with them. The risk management initiative
was targeted on broader organization change and
has begun to encourage an organizational wide
focus, although this is not without difficulties.
During the period of the study additional efforts
were made to identify barriers to change in the
organization. Past initiatives were reviewed to
identify the persistent strengths and weaknesses
of the organization that related to its ability to
operate effectively and efficiently in a changing
environment. The focus continues to be on both
structural and behavioral characteristics.Concluding remarks
In the introduction to this paper we endeavored
to classify a selection of representative research
related to MCS facilitated change into four main
areas that included how MCS are implicated in
the history and context of the organization and
its evolution to a changed culture, concerns with
satisfying the needs of users at different levels in
the hierarchy, the role of networks and boundary
objects, and individual commitment from an
industrial relations perspective. Each of these
approaches could help inform on the role of
MCS in the changes sought in our case examples.
Our aim was to complement these expositions with
an approach that focused more on how users
responded to different modes of change as identi-
fied within a holistic model of planned change that
focused on both technical and behavioral aspects
of change, as change evolved through time.One stream of studies has shown the way orga-
nizations faced with external pressure employ
MCS to respond strategically. These studies
involve consideration of changing managerial cul-
tures from those historically based on non-com-
mercial goals to more market-based approaches.
In the current study both organizations sought to
move from cultures embedded in their histories
based on military doctrine to a more managerial
focus. Our research confirms the view of some
prior studies that an appreciation of the role of
MCS and change requires a study of the long-term
(e.g. Bhimani, 1993; Dent, 1991). By adopting a
long-term approach we were able to show that
the same MCS, ABCM, can experience a life-cycle
that involves an initial birth stage, where it is
embraced enthusiastically by designers, then the
systems can suffer atrophy due to lack of benefits
to users but still survive in an elemental form,
and finally undergo a renewal stage. A challenge
for the case organizations was to learn from these
experiences. Our analysis helps explain the evolu-
tion of MCS through this life-cycle by drawing
on Huy’s framework. This showed that the effec-
tiveness of using MCS as a platform for change
can be explained by considering the extent to
which the organization develops temporal capacity
that is required to manage the alignment of differ-
ent modes of change.
The second line of accounting change literature
identified in our review involves considering how
MCS can deliver information down to operating
managers to enable them to take more effective
decisions related to resources and capabilities,
while providing a way for top management to inte-
grate operations with strategic priorities. In both
organizations ABCM was identified as a way of
delivering information down to operating manag-
ers to enable them to take more effective decisions
related to resources and capabilities, while provid-
ing a way for top management to integrate opera-
tions with strategic priorities. Our study
demonstrates that impediments to induce change
by providing relevant information to operating
managers include systems design difficulties, such
as overly complex design, scope creep or lack of
compatibility between local systems. In both our
cases it was difficult for the organizations to align
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agers. This was, in part, due to an ineffective com-
manding mode of change which was characterized
in the Australian case by a lack of deliverables
from the systems in a timely way and a lack of
commitment of senior managers to demand infor-
mation from the systems. While approaches such
as risk management in the US case attempted to
address this issue, our study suggests that provid-
ing information to help facilitate change at the
operational level and the provision of information
to senior strategic decision makers can be a diffi-
cult task.
The third theme of accounting change research
involves considering MCS as a unifying language
and a way of thinking that assists in developing
networks across the organization and of identify-
ing and managing potential interdependencies
between parts of the organization. In the case
organizations the ABCM systems sought, with
varying success, to create boundary objects to
bring together information from many sources.
The systems sought to provide a single data base
with a common language and to give it a focus
related to effective resource management. Our
study shows that in the case organizations, both
of which had strong historical cultures, changing
ways of thinking is difficult, at least when provid-
ing ABCM as a language to focus on cost con-
sciousness. Huy’s framework shows that to
effectively employ MCS to develop networks it is
necessary to pay attention to the training and
socializing modes of change that are essential in
shifting managers’ mindsets. Our cases confirm
that without attention to these modes, the use of
ABCM to assist in developing networks would
appear to be problematic.
The fourth body of research involves identify-
ing how a lack of attention to industrial relations
issues can be an impediment to employing MCS
to effect change. Our study addresses the issue of
individual commitment to MCS facilitated change
by considering these issues in a more micro behav-
ioral approach. This adds a dimension to the exist-
ing literature which has examined employee
commitment at an aggregate level. By following
Huy’s approach we were able to show that it is
critical to consider that an individual’s commit-ment to MCS, that aim to facilitate change,
involves a period of sense-making and that this
will be guided by emotional rather than clock time.
It was also clear that individual motivation is influ-
enced by an individual’s dispositions to MCS
which may involve prior education and perceived
longer-term personal benefits, such as career pros-
pects. Both cases demonstrated the central impor-
tance of the socializing mode wherein the focus is
on the quality of social relationships among orga-
nizational members and involves issues of individ-
ual emotions, power and politics. Change agents
guide the change process in a cooperative mode
with individuals taking time to accept the rele-
vance of the proposed change to the organization
and themselves.
Our findings that understanding effective change
requires consideration of how individuals respond
to change, together with the technical aspects of
change is not novel, it was recognized in the early
socio-technical approaches to organizational
change (see for example, Emery & Trist, 1960).
However, by building on this and by employing a
comprehensive model that combines, through time,
both rational and behaviorally oriented explana-
tions of change we have shown that understanding
the application of MCS to effect changes in mana-
gerial orientation requires consideration of how
managers sequence different intervention types,
and how they time and pace the interventions. To
undertake such an investigation involving consid-
eration of the different ways that individuals con-
ceptualize time, it was necessary to study change
over a relatively long period of time. By drawing
on and elaborating upon Huy’s model of com-
manding, engineering, teaching and socializing
modes of planned change, we have presented a con-
ceptual integrating framework. The model and the
supporting empirical evidence make obvious that
there is no one best way to combine or sequence
the intervention modes. The combining and
sequencing and the relevant pacing appear, at least
based on our evidence, to depend on considerations
such as whether the change initiative is comprehen-
sive, organization wide or partial within segments,
levels of managerial autonomy, complexity of work
processes and individual’s dispositions to accepting
the new MCS. Temporal capacity is a key factor in
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ance the tensions that derive from the use of multi-
ple modes of intervention. Without balance,
change may generate high levels of confusion and
stress resulting in resistance to change and atrophy
of the change initiative. The world of change is one
of paradoxes where seemingly incompatible inter-
vention modes must often be combined to success-
fully effect planned change.
Finally, the role of serendipity must be
respected. The arrival of managers with the appro-
priate dispositions to implement the new MCS to
help change the organization at the appropriate
time is difficult to attribute to rational decision
making processes in either of the two organiza-
tions studied.
The study has certain implications for guidance
on how to study MCS facilitated change. Huy’s
framework as applied in this paper, with its expli-
cit change taxonomy, has been useful in studying
change in two military organizations. It could be
applied more generally by researchers to study
other aspects of MCS, such as balanced scorecards
or target costing, in facilitating change in both
public and private sectors. The study’s focus on
how managers use MCS will be influenced by the
components of the intervention modes and how
they interact through time. This approach is par-
ticularly pertinent to researchers wishing to study
how change initiatives can lead to managerial
acceptance and use of MCS. The framework pro-
vides a rich approach to understanding how differ-
ent aspects of change are sequenced and paced. It
is this sequencing and pacing with its concern for
different notions of time that provides researchers
with a way of examining the likelihood that effec-
tive MCS change will be dependent on how long
individuals take to embrace the change initiatives.
From a method viewpoint, we have shown that
when studying change, particularly where the
focus is on both technical change and individual’s
changing values, it is important to study events
over a relatively long period of time. This enables
the sporadic nature of change to be incorporated
in the study and how individuals’ responses may
evolve during time. The study also highlights the
benefits of examining two similar organizations
over the same period of time to compare and con-trast ways of using the same type of MCS to help
effect the same type of organizational change. This
provides the opportunity to demonstrate how
MCS facilitated change, based on the same
accounting practices, can differ markedly depend-
ing on factors such as the size and complexity of
the initiative, structural arrangements and per-
sonal dispositions.Acknowledgement
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